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Whether one or the other of these methods of declaring be
adopted, the rule of pleading that the proof must correspond with
the allegations, is still complied with. For if, first, the plaintiff
declares on a judgment which, under the special circumstances
which he sets forth, only amounts to a separate judgment against
A., he proves those special circumstances accordingly, and if,
secondly, he declares as on a joint judgment against A. and B.,
the record sustains him by showing on the face of it a joint judg-
ment, and the court rejects A.'s offer to point out any irregularities
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A way of necessity is limited to a way necessary for the use of the close as it is
at the time.
Where a man, reserving a close, grants the surrounding lands, the right of way
to the close implied to have been reserved or re-granted, is an easement of neces-
sity, and limited to a way necessary for using the close in the condition in which it
then is.
Smble, it would be the same if the close were granted and the surrounding land
reserved.
By an indenture of April 6th 1877, the defendant, Heathcote,
granted to the plaintiffs certain waste lands in Chingford and
Epping Forest, in Essex.
These waste lands entirely surrounded an old enclosure of about
two acres, called Barn Hoppet, which also belonged to Heathcote,
and had always been used exclusively for agricultural purposes.
There was no regular road across the waste from Barn Hoppet
to the high-road, and no right of way was reserved to Heathcote
by the aforesaid indenture.
In 1879 the defendant, Riggs, as tenant of Heatheote, began
preparations for erecting on Barn Hoppet a house and other build-
ings for the supply of refreshments to the public, and for that
purpose had been carting timber and building materials across the
plaintiffs' waste lands.
Thereupon the plaintiffs commenced this action, claiming a
declaration that the defendants were not entitled to a greater or
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other way to and from Barn Hoppet across the lands conveyed to
the plaintiffs as aforesaid, than a way of necessity sufficient for the
use of Barn Hoppet for agricultural purposes only; and they asked
that, if necessary, the position, dimensions and other particulars
of the said way of necessity might be set out and defined, and for
an injunction and damages.
The defendants claimed to be entitled to a way of necessity for
all purposes, and not for agricultural purposes only; and they
accordingly demurred to the whole statement of claim, except so
far as it claimed to have the position and dimensions of the way
of necessity set out and defined.
-Davey, Q. C.. and Giffard, for the defendants, submitted that
the right was the same whether the person claiming it was a grantor
reserving an enclosed piece or was the grantee of the close: Por-
fret v. Ricroft, 1 Wins. Saund., ed. of 1871, p. 571; Clark v.
Cogge, Cro. Jac. 170; Pinnington v. Galland, 9 Ex. 1. The
right was equally taken to be granted, and was, therefore, to be
construed in the manner most favorable to the grantee. Unlike a
prescriptive right of way, which was limited by the user proved
(Wimbledon and Putney Commons Conservators v. -Dixon, Law
Rep. 1 Ch. Div. 362), this was the same as if expressly granted by
deed, and, therefore, might be used for all purposes: United Land
Company v. Great Eastern Railway Co., Law Rep. 10 Ch. 586;
Peweomen v. Coulson, Law Rep. 5 Ch. Div. 133; Finch v. Great
Western Railway Co., 28 W. R. 229.
Catty, Q. C., and Fisher, for the plaintiffs, admitting that this
right must be regarded as a grant, argued that, as it was a way
of necessity, it could not be increased, but must be limited by the
need at the time of the supposed grant: Holmes v. Goring, 2 Bing.
76. This case was an exception to the rule that a man cannot
derogate from his own grant, and must, therefore, not be extended
further than necessary: Wheeldon v. Burrows, Law Rep. 12 Oh
Div. 31. Wood v. Saunders, Law Rep. 10 Ch. 582, and Gayford
v. Moffatt, Law Rep. 4 Oh. 133, showed that the use at the time
of the grant was the limit of the easement; and Williams v.
James, Law Rep. 2 0. P. 577, was an authority that the right
could not be increased..
JESSEL, M.R.-I am afraid that whatever I may call my decision
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in this matter it is in reality a making of new law; for it appears
that the point has never been decided, nor even discussed, in any
reported case.
The real question is this-Whether on a grant of land wholly
surrounding the grantor's remaining land, the implied grant of a
right of way by the grantee to the grantor to enable the latter to
get to his reserved close is a general right of way, or only a right
sufficient for the use of the close in its then state. Now it was laid
down in early times that such a right of way is an exception to the
ordinary rule that a man cannot derogate from his own grant; and
also that the man who grants the land surrounding his close is in
the same position as if he had granted the reserved close and
retained the surrounding land. The right of way is the same; it
is a way of necessity; and that is what is meant by saying that it
must be pleaded as a re-grant. Well, then, what is the extent
of the re-grant? That has not been even discussed anywhere;
there is not a scintilla of authority on the point, except, perhaps,
in the judgment of Lord CAIRNS in Gayford v. Moffatt, where he
says, with reference to Mr. Seijeant Williams's note: " 11Now, that
is exactly the interpretation of the words used in this grant, ' with
all ways to the premises appertaining.' It means, in such a way
as the law would hold to be necessarily appertaining to premies
such as these, that is, a way of necessity. Therefore, immediately
after this lease was granted, this tenant occupying the inner close
became entitled to a way of necessity through the outer close, and
that way must be a way suitable to the business to be carried on on
the premises demised-namely, the business of a wine and spirit
merchant." Therefore he apparently thought that a way of neces-
sity meant a way suitable at the time when the right was created
That is all the authority to be found.
Then, on principle, ought this right, which is an exception, to be
treated as a larger exception than the nature of the case warrants?
The object of implying a re-grant is stated to be that if the owner
of the enclosed piece has no right of way, he cannot use or derive
any benefit at all from his close. But is he entitled to say, I have
reserved to myself more than I really want now at the time of the
grant? It appears to me that the right of way must be confined
to what is necessary at the date of the grant; that is, the owner
takes such a supposed re-grant as will enable him to enjoy the
reserved thing as it is. If more is to be implied, you give him not
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only that which is enough to enable him to enjoy his property, but
that which enables him to enjoy it as fully as if he had reserved a
general right of way for all purposes. I do not think that is the
fair meaning of a way of necessity. It must be limited by the
necessity at the time of the grant, and a man not taking the pre-
caution to reserve any actual right is not entitled to more than is
necessary at the time.
It may be objected to this view that where the grant is of the
enclosed piece, the grantee is entitled to use the land for all pur-
poses, and therefore must have a general right of way. But as the
grantee has not chosen to take an express grant, he is only entitled
to that which would enable him to enjoy the property as it was
granted to him. It is not necessary to give him any greater right.
If it were so, the principle to be applied is not the same, and it is
possible that a grantee might get a greater right than a grantor
takes under an implied re-grant; but I do not think so.
Demurrer overruled.
The point involved in this case seems
equally new on this side of the Atlan-
tic; and it is, therefore, uncertain how
it might be decided; but it may safely
be said, that the tendency of the Ameri-
can law is rather in the contrary direc-
tion from that indicatcd by the Blaster
of the Rolls. A few general proposi-
tions will show the drift of the Ameri-
can decisions on this subject.
1. In the first place, our courts in-
cline to apply the same rule of implied
easements of necessity to grantor re-
taining part of an estate, as to grantee
to whom a part is granted. The Eng-
lish seem to hold that a grantee may
often acquire an implied easement, upon
the severance of an heritage, when a
grantor, under the same circumstances,
would not retain such a right in his own
favor; for to allow him to claim such
a right in the land granted, they hold to
be allowing a grantor to derogate from
his own grant, as it is called. Thus,
they hold that if a man sells land know-
ingly for building purposes, he cannot
afterwards use his remaining adjoining
land for any purpose, which conflicts with
the purpose of the purchaser: Siddons
v. Short, 2 C. P. Div. 572.
It is on this ground that the English
courts say that the grantor of a house with
windows looking out upon his adjoining
land, cannot afterwards build upon the
latter, so as to darken the window- in
the house sold: Coutts v. Gorham, Mloo.
& Mal. 396; Palmer v. Paul, 2 L. J.
Ch. 154. And see Caledonian .Railway
Co. v. Sprot, 2 Macq. 449; Cox v.
Matthews, i Vent. 239; Palmer v.
Fletcher, 1 Lev. 122; Popplewell v.
Ropkinson, Law Rep., 4 Ex. 248.
Whereas, in America, the inclination
is to hold that the grantor has the same
right to use his remaining land to the
detriment of the land granted (in the
absence of any stipulation to the con-
trary), as the grantor has to enjoy that
granted. Both have an absolute, unqua-
lified fee. The same maxim-cujus est
solem ejus est ad ca!uiu-applies to both.
See 31orrison v. Marquardt, 7 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 336, 24 Iowa 35 ; .Pamer
v. Wetmore, 2 Sandf. 316; Mullen v.
Stricler, 19 Ohio St. 135 ; Keats v.
Hugo, 115 Mlass. 204.
